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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOUSEHOLD PETS. The debtor owned a horse, valued at
$100, which was purchased by the family as a pet. The horse
was to be used only for the personal use of family members for
riding. The debtor claimed the horse as exempt, under Idaho
Code § 11-605(1)(B), as a household pet. The court allowed the
exemption because the value of the horse was less than the
$500 limit, was not used for commercial purposes, and was
used only by family members for personal pleasure. In re
Gallegos, 226 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The debtor incurred
employment taxes post-petition and the IRS filed a claim for
those taxes, including the taxes, penalties and interest. The IRS
sought a ruling that the interest on the post-petition taxes was
an administrative expense. The court held that, although
Section 503 does not specifically include post-petition interest
on post-petition taxes, the statute did not exclude administrative
expense priority for post-petition interest; therefore, the interest
would be given administrative expense priority. In e Ianonlo,
226 B.R. 528 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1998).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor made a pre-
petition election to have the IRS retain a portion of a refund for
1993 as estimated tax payment for 1994 taxes. The trustee
sought recovery of the retained refund as either (1) property of
the estate, (2) a preferential transfer or (3) a fraudulent transfer.
The court held that the retained refund was not recoverable by
the trustee because the election to retain the refund was
irrevocable and turned the refund into the payment of taxes for
1994. The court also held that the election was not a fraudulent
or preferential transfer because the taxpayer received full
consideration for the election. Matter of Orrill, 226 B.R. 563
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1997).
CLAIMS . The IRS filed two tax claims after the bar date.
Both claims were for priority tax claims and the trustee
objected to the claims, arguing that the claims should be
reduced to a lower priority because the claims were filed late.
The court held that the priority of first priority tax claims is not
affected by the late filing of the claims. In re Bulldog
Trucking, Inc., 226 B.R. 174 (W.D. N.C. 1997).
DISCHARGE . The taxpayer failed to timely file tax returns
for 1985 through 1987. The IRS filed substitute returns and
made an assessment of deficiency based on those returns
because the taxpayer made no response to any notice of
deficiency. Two years after the assessment, the taxpayer filed
Forms 1040 which reflected the amounts assessed by the IRS
and did not provide any additional or different information
about the taxpayer’s income and expenses. The taxpayer filed
for Chapter 7 three years later and sought to have the taxes
declared dischargeable. The IRS argued that the taxes were
nondischargeable because no return was filed. The IRS argued
that the taxpayer’s late-filed returns were useless once an
assessment was made based on substitute returns. The
Bankruptcy Court and District Court held for the taxpayer, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that a post-assessment
Form 1040 was not a return if it no longer served any tax
purpose or has any effect under the Internal Revenue Code. In
re Hindenlang, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,214 (6th Cir.
1999), rev’g, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,728 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
The IRS filed a claim for 1986, 1987 and 1988 taxes owed by
the debtors. The taxes were due more than three years before
the bankruptcy petition was filed. The 1986 and 1987 taxes
were assessed more than 240 days before the petition but the
1988 taxes were assessed 151 days before the petition. The
debtors received a discharge in the case but, after the discharge,
the IRS continued to seek payment of the taxes through levies,
even after letters from the debtors were sent reminding the IRS
of the discharge. The IRS argued that the three year period
should have been equitably waived by the court but did not
provide any reason for the equitable waiver. The court held that
the IRS’s failure to seek the equitable waiver before violating
the automatic stay of the discharge prohibited applying
equitable principles to the IRS’s claims. Therefore, the court
ruled that the IRS could continue assessments and collection
only as to the 1988 taxes which were not discharged. In re
Gilmore, 226 B.R. 567 (E.D. Tex. 1998), aff’g, 198 B.R. 686
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtors’ property included a
residence which had $13,000 in equity. If the property was sold,
the estate would incur $10,000 in taxable capital gains unless
the bankruptcy estate was entitled to use the debtors’ capital
gains exclusion under I.R.C. § 121. The court held that the
capital gains exclusion for the sale of a residence did not pass to
the bankruptcy estate. In r  Winch, 226 B.R. 591 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1998).
The Chapter 13 debtors’ property included a residence. The
debtors’ plan valued the residence by reducing the fair market
value by the amount of tax on capital gains which would be
recognized on the sale. of the residence. The trustee objected to
the plan as not providing as much for unsecured creditors as a
Chapter 7 liquidation because the trustee would be eligible for
the I.R.C. § 121 exclusion for gain from a sale of a residence.
The court held that the capital gains exclusion would be
available to a chapter 7 trustee and denied confirmation of the
plan. Thus, these two courts join the split among courts
reaching opposite holdings as to whether the capital gains
exclusio  for the sale of a residence passes to the bankruptcy
estate. In re Munster, 226 B.R. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC Board of Directors has
announced that it has approved for reinsurance and subsidy the
insurance of corn, grain sorghum, soybeans, cotton, and rice in
select states and counties under the Crop Revenue Coverage
plan of insurance for the 1999 crop year. 64 Fed Reg. 4609
(Jan. 29, 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES . The executor decided to
borrow money sufficient to pay the decedent’s federal and state
estate taxes. The loan agreement provided for a term of seven
year, no prepayment of interest or principal and for acceleration
of payment of all interest which would be due under the loan
upon default. The IRS ruled that a deduction could be claimed
on the estate tax return for the entire amount of the post-death
interest expense to be incurred by the estate, provided the
expense was necessarily incurred in the administration of the
estate within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) and
was allowable under local law. Whether the interest expense
would be necessarily incurred in the administration of the estate
was a factual determination on which the IRS would not rule.
Ltr. Rul. 9903038, Oct. 2, 1998.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE . The decedent’s will
provided for bequests to a charitable foundation established by
the decedent. The decedent’s heirs hired attorneys to prepare
litigation against the decedent, the foundation and the
foundation trustee for tortious interference with inheritance.
The parties entered into negotiations after the decedent’s death
and reached a settlement which included additional payments to
the heirs from the foundation bequest. The foundation stated
that the settlement was reached in order to avoid the legal costs
of litigation. The decedent’s estate claimed the settlement
payments as a deduction as either a claim against the estate or
administrative expenses. The court denied the deduction,
holding that the settlement was a nondeductible distribution to
heirs because the cause of action for interference with
inheritance could not have been brought against the decedent
but was a liability of the foundation or its trustee. The court
held that the settlement was not a deductible administrative
expense because the estate was not benefited or diminished by
the action. Lindberg v. United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,334 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 927 F. Supp. 1401
(D. Colo. 1996).
LIFE INSURANCE . A husband and wife established a life
insurance trust for their children, grandchildren and other issue.
The trust owned a life insurance policy on the husband and
wife. The husband and wife and their children were partners in
a partnership which owned and operated commercial property.
The children entered into an agreement with the trust to pay all
the future life insurance premiums in exchange for an
ownership interest in the policy. The IRS ruled that the sale of
an interest in the life insurance policy would not cause a portion
of the proceeds to be included in the gross income of the
beneficiaries because the children were partners with the
insured parents. Ltr Rul. 9903020, Oct. 26, 1998.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent’s will provided for
a marital trust and other direct bequests to the surviving spouse.
The executor made the election to treat the trust property as
QTIP but included the value of some of the direct bequests in
the marital deduction for the QTIP election. The IRS ruled that
the incorrect valuation did not affect the validity of the QTIP
election, the direct bequests were not included in the QTIP
election amount, and the QTIP trust and direct bequests were
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9902014, Oct. 15,
1998.
The decedent had established a trust which was to be split at
the decedent’s death into a marital trust and family trust. The
trust allowed distributions of principal to the decedent’s
daughter, although all income of the marital trust was to be
distributed to the surviving spouse. The trust attempted to
remove this discretionary power by petitioning the state court to
ref rm th  trust to remove the discretionary power to distribute
principal to persons other than the surviving spouse by splitting
the marital trust into a separate trust without the discretionary
power.. The IRS held that the marital trust did not qualify as
QTIP. Th  IRS ruled that the split of the trust was ineffective to
mak  the marital portion QTIP because that portion of the trust
did not qualify as QTIP before the split. Ltr. Rul. 9903031,
Sept. 30, 1998.
The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust for the
taxpayer’s spouse with a remainder to the taxpayer’s children.
The taxpayer made two contributions of property to the trust, in
1989 and 1990. The taxpayer and spouse had filed gift tax
returns for 1989 and 1990, made the split-gift elections, did not
include the contributions to the trust in the returns and did not
make any QTIP election as to the trust. The spouse died and the
trust property passed to the taxpayer’s children. The IRS ruled:
(1) The taxpayer's 1989 and 1990 transfers to the trust provided
the spouse with the necessary qualifying income interest for life
under I.R.C. § 2523(f)(2)(B) such that the election under I.R.C.
§ 2523(f)(2)(C) to treat the property as QTIP could have been
made. The transfers to the trust were not reported nor was the
QTIP el ction made on either the 1989 or the 1990 gift tax
returns filed by taxpayer. Because no election was made, we
conclude that taxpayer's 1989 and 1990 transfers to the trust are
not subject to a QTIP election under I.R.C. § 2523(f)(4), and
are, therefore, not deductible from the taxpayer's taxable gifts in
those years. (2) Since the spouse received an unrestricted right
to the income from the property transferred to the trust in 1989
and in 1990, the spouse received a present interest in the
property, within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b). An
exclusion of $10,000 was allowable with respect to both the
989 and 1990 transfers by the taxpayer. (3) The trust assets
attributable to the taxpayer's 1989 and 1990 transfers to the
trust would not be included in the spouse's gross estate under
I.R.C. § 2044 because no election was made under I.R.C. §
2523(f)(4) with respect to the trust. Additionally, the remainder
inter st that passed upon the spouse's death to taxpayer's living
issue was not subject to inclusion in the spouse's gross estate
under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037, and 2038 since the spouse did not
transfer the property to the trust. One-half the value of the
transf rs to the trust in 1989 and 1990, attributable to the
spouse by virtue of the spouse's consent to split gifts with
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taxpayer, to the extent eligible for split-gift treatment under
I.R.C. § 2513 would be included in the spouse's adjusted
taxable gifts pursuant to I.R.C. § 2001(b). (4) The trust assets
attributable to taxpayer's 1989 and 1990 transfers to the trust
would not be included in taxpayer's gross estate. Ltr. Rul.
9903040, Oct. 14, 1998.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS . A
husband and wife established four irrevocable trusts for each of
their four children and their issue. The grantors were trustees in
each trust which also had the primary beneficiary as co-trustee.
The trusts were funded with stock in corporations owned in part
by the grantors. The trusts provided for discretionary
distributions for "the general welfare, education and the
maintenance in health and reasonable comfort of the members
of the class, considering the needs, circumstances and the usual
standard of living of each, using the guidelines set out in the
following paragraphs." The trusts were amended to provide that
any voting rights of the shares of stock had to be exercised only
with the consent of the co-trustees other than the grantor-wife.
The IRS ruled that the transfers of stock to the trusts were
completed gifts because the grantors’ fiduciary power to
distribute income and corpus with respect to each of the trusts
was sufficiently limited by a fixed and ascertainable standard.
The IRS also ruled that the retained trustee powers of the
grantors to distribute income and principal would not cause the
principal and accumulated income of the trusts to be included in
the grantors’ gross estates. The IRS ruled that if the wife died
more than three years after the amendment of the trusts, the
trust property would not be included in her estate. Ltr. Rul.
9903025, Oct. 27, 1998.
VALUATION . The decedent’s estate included the decedent’s
community property interest in securities and real property held
in a revocable trust and the decedent’s pre-deceased spouse’s
community interest in the same property which was held in two
QTIP trusts and the revocable trust. Some of the trusts’ assets
were contributed to a new limited partnership with the
decedent’s son and one QTIP trust receiving general
partnership interests and the revocable trust and other QTIP
trust receiving limited partnership interests. The estate valued
the partnership interests of each trust separately with discounts
for minority interests and lack of marketability. The IRS argued
that the decedent should have been considered the owner of all
the trusts; therefore, the decedent should have been considered
the owner of all the partnership interests in a block for purposes
of valuation for estate tax. The court held that the IRS had no
authority to deem the decedent as owner of all the trusts’ assets;
therefore, the partnership interests owned by each trust could be
valued separately. In addition, the partnership agreement
provided that transfers of limited partnership interests were
subject to limitations unless the general partners consented to
the new partners as partners. Thus, the court held that the
limited partnership interests transferred by the estate would be
considered “assignee” interests for purpose of valuation. Est te
of Nowell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-15.
The decedent’s estate included stock in a family corporation
owned by a QTIP trust, a revocable trust and the decedent
personally. The IRS argued that the stock should be considered
as owned as a block by the decedent. The court held that there
was no authority for aggregating the ownership of the stock in
one person where the stock was owned by a revocable trust and
a QTIP trust. Est. of Mellinger v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. No. 4
(1999).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CASUALTY LOSSES. The IRS has issued guidance in
determining the proper tax treatment for the cost of restoring
uninsured property damage caused by severe flooding and how
taxpayers should treat the expenses relating to the restoration of
business property to its pre-flood condition. The issue was
whether such costs should be treated as part of the casualty loss
under I.R.C. § 165 as repairs deductible under I.R.C. § 162(a),
or as capital expenditures under I.R.C. § 263.
Generally, under Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1), the amount of
the deduction is the difference between the fair market value of
the subject property before and after the casualty, to the extent
such amount does not exceed the property's adjusted basis.
Thus, the casualty loss does not include the repair or restoration
expenses.
While the cost of repairs is not deductible as a casualty loss,
the cost of repairs can serve as evidence of the diminution in
fair market value caused by the casualty. Under the regulations,
a taxpayer must show that (1) the repairs are necessary to
restore the property to its condition immediately before the
casualty, (2) the amount spent for such repairs is not excessive,
(3) the repairs do not care for more than the damage suffered,
and (4) the value of the property after the repairs does not as a
result of the repairs exceed the value of the property
immediately before the casualty. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-
7(a)(2)(ii). The determination of whether certain costs are
deductible as repairs under I.R.C. § 162 or must be treated as
capital expenditures under I.R.C. § 263 generally turns on the
taxpayer's particular set of facts. If the expenditure returns the
taxpayer's property to the state it was in before the situation
prompting the expenditure arose, and does not make the
relevant property more valuable, more useful, or longer-lived,
then it is usually deemed a deductible repair. Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 337 (1962), nonacq.
on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8. If, on the other hand, the
expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life expectancy,
strength or capacity of the property as compared with its status
prior to the condition necessitating the expenditure, then this
expenditure is capital in nature. Id. at 338.
Accordingly, if taxpayers incur costs simply to restore their
business properties to their pre-flood state, and such
expenditures do not materially enhance the value, use, life
expectancy, strength or capacity of such property beyond that
state, then these costs may be currently deducted as repair
expenses under I.R.C. § 162. These costs are not generally
treated as capital expenditures under I.R.C. § 263. FSA
9903030.
COOPERATIVES . The IRS has issued advice on whether
and to what extent an agricultural cooperative is entitled to a
dividends received deduction with respect to foreign trade
income received from a foreign sales corporation (FSC). I.R.C.
§§ 923(a)(4), 245(c) provide special rules for agricultural
cooperatives which are intended to give FSC benefits to such
entities. The rules exempt the FSC from any tax on foreign
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trade income if the income is distributed currently to the
cooperative shareholder. If the income is not distributed
currently, then the FSC is taxable on its nonexempt foreign
trade income. Neither I.R.C. § 923(a)(4) nor I.R.C. § 245(c) is
clear in its use of the term “exempt foreign trade income” since,
if there is a current distribution to the cooperative, all foreign
trade income is exempt at the FSC level. The IRS stated that the
legislative history makes clear that if there is a distribution, then
there is no dividends received deduction for what in the absence
of I.R.C. § 923(a)(4) would be nonexempt foreign trade
income. With respect to exempt foreign trade income
(determined without applying I.R.C. § 923(a)(4)), a dividends
received deduction is permitted. However, a distribution is
treated as first attributable to I.R.C. § 923(a)(4) exempt foreign
trade income. FSA 9999-9999-45.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer
was fired from employment and signed a release which released
the employer from liability under a “laundry list” of possible
federal employment statutes. The taxpayer testified that no
claims against the employer were asserted by the taxpayer,
either before or after termination of employment. The court
held that the payments made by the employer were includible in
gross income. Ball v. Comm’r, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,195 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1997-549.
The taxpayer was a plaintiff in a class action suit against a
former employer for its violation of section 510 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29
U.S.C. § 1140. The taxpayer excluded the taxpayer’s share of
the settlement from the taxpayer’s gross income as the proceeds
of a tort-like action. The District Court held that the settlement
proceeds were included in gross income because a violation of
ERISA section 510 did not fit within the "tort or tort-type
rights" exclusion of I.R.C. 104(a)(2). However, the District
Court held that the proceeds should not have been subject to
FICA taxes because the taxpayer had already received full
payment for the services performed for the employer; thus, the
settlement could not represent wages or remuneration for
employment. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
settlement included awards for personal injuries such as mental
distress which were tort-like and excludible from gross income.
The appellate court also reversed on the FICA issue and held
that, to the extent the settlement award was for lost back or
future wages, the settlement proceeds were subject to FICA tax.
Gerbec v. United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,194
(6th Cir. 1999), rev’g, 957 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
The taxpayer agreed to a merger of the taxpayer’s company
with another company with an exchange of stock. The relations
between the two parties soured and the taxpayer eventually
sued the other company for fraudulent inducement to enter into
a contract and interference with a business relationship. The
taxpayer received jury awards for both claims plus prejudgment
interest. The court held that the jury awards for the claims and
the prejudgment interest were included in the taxpayer’s gross
income. Gregg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-10.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
partnership purchased a commercial building with a $21 million
loan. The loan amount increased over the next three years to
$24 million and the lender required the taxpayer to sell the
building. The building was eventually sold for just under $12
milli n and the buyer required the lender to release all liens
against the property. The lender not only released the liens but
forgave the loan amount above the amount received from the
buyer. The taxpayer was insolvent at the time of the sale and
discharge and argued that the transaction resulted in discharge
of ind btedness income which was not recognized because of
the t xpayer’s insolvency. The court held that the transaction
was solely a sale of the property with the amount realized as the
amount of money received plus the amount of liabilities
forgiven. The court stated that the discharge of indebtedness did
not occur separate from the transfer of the property because the
buyer made the release of liability a condition of the sale. 2925
Briarpark, Ltd., 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,209 (5th
Cir. 1999).
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayers sold a business property
under a sales agreement which provided for escrow of initial
payments and the title to the property until the closing of the
sale. The amounts paid into the escrow by the buyer were
immediately transferred to the taxpayers who made personal
use of the funds. The sales agreement provided for the return of
the deposit funds if the sale failed to close due to the taxpayers’
fault. The escrow agreement was extended into the next tax
year and eventually fell through when the taxpayers could not
supply clear title to the property. The taxpayers had to repay
almost all of the deposits. The IRS argued that the deposits
were to be included in the taxpayers gross income when
distributed to them because the taxpayers had a claim of right to
the funds. The court held that the distribution was made only
under a contingent claim and that the taxpayers always were
liable for repayment until the sale closed. Therefore, the court
held that the deposits were not included in the taxpayers’
income in the year received. Ahadpour v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-9.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION .  The IRS has issued guidance on
the issue of the deductibility of daily transportation expenses of
traveling between a taxpayer’s residence and a work location.
In general, daily transportation expenses incurred in going
between a taxpayer's residence and a work location are
nondeductible commuting expenses. However, such expenses
are deductible under several circumstances.
(1) A taxpayer may deduct daily transportation expenses
incurred in going between the taxpayer's residence and a
temporary work location outside the metropolitan area where
the taxpayer lives and normally works. However, unless
paragraph (2) or (3) below applies, daily transportation
expenses incurred in going between the taxpayer's residence
and a temporary work location within that metropolitan area are
nondeductible commuting expenses.
(2) If a taxpayer has one or more regular work locations away
from the taxpayer's residence, the taxpayer may deduct daily
transportation expenses incurred in going between the
taxpayer's residence and a temporary work location in the same
trade or business, regardless of the distance. The IRS will
continue not to follow Walker v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 537
(1993).
(3) If a taxpayer's residence is the taxpayer's principal place of
business within the meaning of I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A), the
taxpayer may deduct daily transportation expenses incurred in
going between the residence and another work location in the
sam  trade or business, regardless of whether the other work
location is regular or temporary and regardless of the distance.
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For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), the following
rules apply in determining whether a work location is
temporary. If employment at a work location is realistically
expected to last (and does in fact last) for 1 year or less, the
employment is temporary in the absence of facts and
circumstances indicating otherwise. If employment at a work
location is realistically expected to last for more than 1 year or
there is no realistic expectation that the employment will last
for 1 year or less, the employment is not emporary, regardless
of whether it actually exceeds 1 year. If employment at a work
location initially is realistically expected to last for 1 year or
less, but at some later date the employment is realistically
expected to exceed 1 year, that employment will be treated as
temporary (in the absence of facts and circumstances indicating
otherwise) until the date that the taxpayer's realistic expectation
changes, and will be treated as not temporary after that date.
The determination that a taxpayer's residence is the taxpayer's
principal place of business within the meaning of I.R.C. §
280A(c)(1)(A) is not necessarily determinative of whether the
residence is the taxpayer's tax home for other purposes,
including the travel-away-from-home deduction under I.R.C. §
162(a)(2). Rev. Rul. 99-7, I.R.B. 1999-__, __.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. Before the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, the IRS could impose penalties on a partner
only through the application of the deficiency procedures after
the completion of a partnership level proceeding. The 1997 Act
provided that, for partnerships under audit for taxable years
ending after August 5, 1997, partnership level proceedings
included the determination of applicable penalties at the
partnership level. Partners now may raise any partner level
defenses to the imposition of penalties only in a subsequent
refund action. The IRS has issued temporary regulations
mandating that a partnership's penalty defenses are to be
resolved during the partnership proceeding. Nevertheless, any
individual defenses that a partner may have to the imposition of
a penalty may be brought by the partner in a refund action
subsequent to the partnership level determination. The
temporary regulations incorporate a large number of defenses at
the partnership level. The majority of a partner's defenses to the
imposition of penalties are not specific to a particular partner,
but can be determined by reference to the activities of the
partnership. The applicability of these defenses may be resolved
at the partnership level during the partnership proceeding. In
addition, the temporary regulations modify the computational
adjustment rules to allow the IRS to assess penalties under
those procedures. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6221-1T.
The 1997 Act added a special rule for partial settlement
agreements in I.R.C. § 6229(f)(2), providing that the period for
assessing any tax attributable to the settled items is determined
as if the partial settlement had not been executed. Thus, the
limitations period applicable to the last partnership item to be
resolved for the partnership's taxable year under audit is
controlling with respect to all disputed partnership items
(including settled items) for such partnership taxable year. The
temporary regulations state that the one year period for
assessing partnership items that convert to nonpartnership items
applicable to settlement agreements under I.R.C. §
6231(b)(1)(C) does not apply to partial settlement agreements
under I.R.C. § 6229(f)(2). Moreover, the temporary regulations
clarify that the partner remains subject to the unified audit
procedures regarding the nonsettled items. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6224(c)-3T.
To resolve the uncertainty under prior law in the situation
wh re a TMP executes an agreement extending the statute of
limitations as to all partners while, unknown to the IRS, the
TMP is a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, the 1997 Act
provided that the IRS may rely on the executed statute
extension agreement unless it is notified of the TMP's
bankruptcy proceeding. If the IRS is not notified of the TMP's
b nkruptcy proceeding, statute extensions granted by the TMP
are binding on all partners in the partnership. The temporary
regulations provide a mechanism for the TMP, or other
pa tners, to provide notice to the IRS that the TMP is a debtor
in a bankruptcy proceeding and therefore is ineligible to serve
as TMP and extend the statute under I.R.C. § 6229. This
mechanism is derived from existing regulations that provide
guidance on how to notify the IRS of information concerning a
partnership's partners. T mp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(b)-2T.
T  1997 Act amended the small partnership exception to the
unified partnership audit procedures found in I.R.C. § 6231.
Formerly, in order to qualify for the small partnership
exception, the partnership had to have 10 or fewer partners at
all times during the tax year, each of whom was a natural
person (other than a nonresident alien) or an estate, and for
which each partner's share of each partnership item was the
same as that partner's share of every other partnership item. The
1997 Act amended the small partnership exception by allowing
partnerships to qualify for the exception even if they have a C
corporation for a partner or specially allocate some partnership
items. The temporary regulations modify the existing
regulations interpreting the small partnership exception to take
account of this change in the law. Temp. Treas. Reg. §
301.6231(a)-1T. 64 Fed. Reg. 3837 (Jan. 26, 1999).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that it will allow
employers to establish a system to electronically receive Form
W-5, Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Certificate.
Ann. 99-3, I.R.B. 1999-__, __.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers
purchased ten rental properties for the purpose of earning
i come from the rent collected. Petitioners did not offer or
dve is  any of the parcels for sale but lost the properties at
foreclosur . The lenders who foreclosed upon the ten parcels
we  not customers of petitioners. The taxpayers originally
declared the rental income as business income on Schedule C
but filed n amended return which claimed the rental income on
Schedul  E, also filing for a refund of self-employment tax paid
on the rental income. The court found that the taxpayers did not
acquir  and did not hold title to the ten parcels for the purpose
of selling them to customers with a view to the gains and profits
tha  might be derived from such sales; therefore, the rental
income was not self-employment income. Blythe v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1999-11.
CITATION UPDATES
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R 227 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1998) (S corporatrion election). See Vol. 9, p 175.
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The Agricultural Law Press announces the publication of the nine-year archives of the
Agricultural Law Digest and the entire Agricultural Law Manual on CD-ROM.
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FAST AND COMPREHENSIVE . These CDs give you the speed and efficiency of computers in access to
agricultural law. The combination Agricultural Law Digest and Agricultural Law Manual CD contains nine
years of developments in agricultural law and the complete text of the most comprehensive single book on
agricultural law. Agricultural law becomes as accessible as a mouse click. You can search the files, print any
page or download selected text to your computer.    There is no time or other limit to your use of these disks  .
FULL WORD AND PHRASE SEARCH: A simple yet effective search program included on the CDs
allows searching of all documents for words and phrases. The Digest  includes a full index of all issues. The
Manual includes a synopsis of the entire book which is hyperlinked to the text. Looking for requirements of
special use valuation elections? Just click on the item in the synopsis and the CD automatically conveys you
to that section of the text. Looking for discussions of Mizell, Wuebker or FOBD? Just enter the case name or
term and the CD does the searching for you.
CROSS-PLATFORM ACCESSIBLE .  These CDs make use of Adobe Acrobat Reader + Search,©
included on the CDs. The CDs and software are fully compatible with Windows, Macintosh, UNIX and most
major operating systems. Adobe Acrobat uses PDF files similar to those used by the IRS to electronically
download forms and publications on the internet. The pages can be searched, copied to your word processor
and printed. Yet, for all the computer wizardry included on the CD, the materials have the feel and
appearance of the printed books, providing the user with the ability to browse and flip through the pages as
well as perform computer assisted searches.
UPDATES AVAILABLE . Supplement the CD with an e-mail subscription to the Digest and you will
have a comprehensive and timely research resource for your agricultural client’s needs. The CDs will be
fully updated three times a year. You can subscribe to all updates or an annual update.
OFFERED IN THREE VERSIONS : (1) The archive of all nine years of the Digest. (2) The entire
Manual with hyperlinked synopsis. (3) Both the Digest archive and the Manual.
           Disk                                                                   Price                        Annual update                                                                        Triannual update
Agricultural Law Digest (nine year archive) plus
Agricultural Law Manual................................$300..................$100...............$125
Agricultural Law Digest (nine year archive)..........$250...................$75...............$100
Agricultural Law Manual................................$115..................$100...............$125
To order your disk write or e-mail Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405
